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Volume
1, No. 2,
August 2002
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Rationing as a Signal
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Jeong-Yoo Kim*
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Department of Economics, University at
Albany, SUNY, U.S.A.
and
Department of Economics, Dongguk University, South
Korea
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Abstract
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Two consumers sequentially
purchase at most one unit of some homogeneous good
from a monopolist who knows the state of nature,
either high or low. I characterize a rationing
equilibrium at which the high-type monopolist
produces only one unit and rations customers,
whereas the low-type monopolist serves customers
by producing two units.
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Key words
:
rationing; quality; signals; sequential purchases
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JEL classification
:
D45; L12; L15
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