|
|
|
Volume 5, No. 3,
December
2006
|
|
|
Financial Predation by the "Weak"
|
|
|
|
Spiros Bougheas*
|
|
|
School of Economics, University of
Nottingham, U.K.
|
|
|
|
Saksit
Thananittayaudom
|
|
|
Faculty of
Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
|
We consider a
Stackelberg game, where a financially constrained
leader competes with a "deep pocket" follower, and
analyze the trade-off between a financial and a
strategic advantage for both the design of financial
contracts and market structure.
|
|
|
|
Key words
:
predation; financial contracts; Stackelberg game
|
|
JEL classification
:
G32;
G43
|
|
|
Back
|